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M. Kate Calvert*
I. Introduction
Pursuant to section 19.2-264.2 of the Virginia Code, a sentence of death
may be imposed upon a finding that the defendant's conduct in committing
the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim."'
The vileness aggravator can be established with any one of the three "sub-
elements" of torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery. A capital
sentencing jury must find the presence of at least one of these sub-elements.2
However, the jury is not required to agree unanimously upon which sub-
element its sentence rests.' Consequently, a jury may impose a death
sentence when some jurors consider the murder vile because it involved
torture, others because the murder involved aggravated battery to the
victim, while still others because the murder evidenced the defendant's
depravity of mind.' Further, these sub-elements need not be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.' Only the more generalized finding of vileness must be
so proven.
6
J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
Millsaps College. Thank you to my family and friends and the members of the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse.
1. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000). The other statutory aggravator, future
dngerousness, is defined in S 19.2-264.2 as "a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society." Id.
2. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000).
3. See id.
4. See Douglas R. Banghart, V'leness: Isues andAnalysis, 12 CAP. DEF.J. 77,98 (1999)
(discussing the sub-elements of the vileness aggravator and the effect of a lack of a unanimity
requirement for the sub-elements).
5. See S 19.2-264.4(C).
6. Id.
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The failure of the Virginia General Assembly and the Virginia courts
to require that these sub-elements be found unanimously and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt violates the constitutional mandates the United
States Supreme Court has established for capital sentencing schemes.7
Godfrey v. Georgia' stated that a capital sentencing scheme must "channel
the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide
'specific and detailed guidance.'" 9 The lack of both a unanimity requirement
and a reasonable doubt standard for the vileness sub-elements may result in
a jury's imposition of a death sentence without agreement as to the basis of
its sentence. Moreover, the jury is not required to employ clear and objec-
tive standards; it is given no standards. Nevertheless, the lack of a unanim-
ity requirement for the vileness sub-elements has withstood constitutional
challenges based on the Godfrey standards.1
Challenges to the lack of unanimity and the lack of a reasonable doubt
standard in finding the vileness sub-elements have been given new ammuni-
tion, however, by three recent United States Supreme Court decisions. The
practical issue in each of these cases centers on the distinction between an
element of a crime and a sentencing factor."' However, the constitutional
7. Sentences of death imposed without the use of clear and objective standards to
channel the jury's discretion are arbitrary and capricious death sentences which violate the
Eighth Amendment. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). Further, death sentences
are qualitatively different from other punishments and therefore require a heightened degree
of reliability. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
8. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
9. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 428 (1980) (citations omitted).
10. See Briley v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 57, 66-67 (Va. 1980); Briley v. Bass, 584
F. Supp. 807, 842 (E.D. Va. 1984). These two cases involve the same defendant, Linwood E.
Briley, but encompass two unrelated criminal series of events and three separate capital
murder convictions. In Briley v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
Virginia's vileness aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague in light of the Godfrey
decision. Briley v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d at 65-67. The court distinguished the facts of
Godfrey from the case before it, finding the instant case so inhuman and outrageous "that it
could only have been done by those possessed of depraved minds" while Godfrey "killed
without warning and instantly." Id. at 66-67. In Briley v. Bass, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld Virginia's vileness aggravator by reading
Godfrey as approving of the Georgia vileness aggravator. However, the district court also
held that the trial court's instructions regarding the Georgia aggravator were unconstitution-
ally vague. Briley v. Bass, 584 F. Supp. at 842. The District Court explained that the Godfrey
Court found unconstitutional the vagueness of the sentencing judge's instructions to the jury
as to how this [vileness] criteria was to be applied," and that such vagueness was not present
in the case before the court. Id.
11. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2360-66 (2000) (holding that any fact,
other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt);
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issues which these cases implicate include fundamental rights such as the
right to a fair and impartial jury and the right to have every element of a
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The most recent decision,
Apprendi v. NewJersey,2 constitutes a break in the Supreme Court's pattern
of avoiding the constitutional issues raised in these "sentencing factor"
cases. 
13
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,4 the United States Supreme Court first
used the term "sentencing factor" to refer to a factor not found by a jury
that could nonetheless increase a sentence imposed by a judge.'" The
McMillan Court refused to establish a bright line test to assess whether such
sentencing factors ran afoul of constitutional guarantees and instead em-
ployed a multi-factor set of criteria to determine whether Winship
protections applied to sentence enhancements. 6 The McMillan decision
touched off a trend by state legislatures and by Congress of placing more
discretion in the hands of sentencing judges."7 With the explosion of recidi-
vist statutes and the passage of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this trend
has become more pronounced in recent years. 8
While the McMillan Court avoided the larger constitutional concerns
raised by the statute in question by circumventing the settled Winship and
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999) (holding that the phrase "series of
violations" in the federal continuing criminal enterprise statute requires a jury to unani-
mously agree upon which specific violations form the basis of its finding); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 232 (1999) (holding that the federal carjacking statute contains three
separate offenses each of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and agreed upon
by a jury).
12. 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
13. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2355-60 (2000) (addressing a defendant's
right to a trial by jury and the reasonable doubt standard for factors employed to enhance a
sentence).
14. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
15. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986).
16. Id. at 86-88; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due
Process Clause mandates that defendants cannot be convicted except upon proof of every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that the State bears the burden of
proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt).
17. See generally Mark D. Knoll, Searching for the "Tail oftheDog. Finding 'Elements"
of Crimes in the Wake ofMcMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1058-59
(1999) (explaining that the McMillan decision prompted a revolutionary change in the use of
sentencing factors to enhance penalties).
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. S 3559(c) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1998);
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 775.082 (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE S 667(a)(1) (West 1999); 28
U.S.C. SS 991-998 (1988) (Federal Sentencing Guidelines); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL (1999).
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Mullaney9 issues, the recent trend of offering sentencing judges more discre-
tion has returned these questions to the forefront. 0 After the McMillan
decision, the United States Supreme Court flirted with these constitutional
issues and often successfully avoided them.21 However, in its 2000 term, the
United States Supreme Court decided to face these issues in Apprendi. In
Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any factor, aside from prior convic-
tions, which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutorily pre-
scribed maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.22
Two fundamental constitutional rights were at issue in Apprendi. The
first of these was a defendant's right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 2' The second right implicated in
Apprendi was due process.24 Winsbip and Mullaney established that the Due
Process Clause requires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every element necessary to constitute the crime for which a defendant may
be charged and that the burden of disproving these facts cannot be shifted
to the defendant. 2  The Mullaney Court further recognized that a state
cannot circumvent Winsbip protections merely by "redefin [ ing] the elements
that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear
19. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
20. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-04 (1975) (holding that the Due Process
Clause mandates defendants cannot be bound to disprove elements of a crime; prosecutors
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged); Winsbip, 397
U.S. at 364.
21. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818-20 (1999) (avoiding the
constitutional issues by construing the statute in question so that the constitutional issues
were not implicated); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,239-52 (1999) (same); Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1988) (finding that the use of prior convictions
to increase a sentence did not violate the Constitution because recidivism is a traditional
sentencing factor and because the sentencing factor did not shift the burden of proving the
elements of the crime to defendants); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-11 (1977)
(holding that a New York statute which required defendants to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce
a second-degree murder charge to manslaughter did not violate the Due Process Clause
because the State still had to prove every element of second-degree murder).
22. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
23. Id. at 2355-56; see U.S. CONST. amend VI; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 157-58 (1968) (holding that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right and therefore
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees jury trials for all serious criminal cases).
24. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2355-56.
25. Mdulaney, 421 U.S. at 701-04; Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
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solely on the extent of punishment."26 Yet, the labeling of these elements
of punishment as "factors" was squarely at issue in Apprendi"
The convergence of these two fundamental constitutional rights in
Apprendi forced the Supreme Court to answer the question it avoided twice
in its 1999 term. In Jones v. United States," the Court'construed the federal
carjacking statute as containing three separate offenses.29 The alternate
reading of the statute was that it contained a single offense with three
maximum penalties, two of which depended on factors exempt from the
jury's consideration." TheJones Court employed statutory construction to
avoid larger constitutional issues."' Similarly, in Richardson v. United
States,32 the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional implications of the
federal continuing criminal enterprise statute by construing the statute to
require jury unanimity with respect to each drug violation comprising the
series of offenses.3 The Court thereby avoided the constitutional issues
which would arise if the statute were construed otherwise. 4 The alternate
construction required unanimity only for the general element of a "series"
of drug violitions rather than the underlying drug violations comprising the
series.'
Apprendi answered the constitutional question left unanswered in Jones
and pronounced a rule that questions the use of sentencing factors in situa-
tions in which the factor increases the maximum statutory punishment.36
By implication, Apprendi also foreshadows the answer to the constitutional
question left unanswered in Richardson. The first portion of this article will
review the Apprendi decision in detail and consider its complicated history.
The second part will apply Apprendi to the Virginia capital sentencing
scheme. This article proposes that Apprendi, Jones, and Ricbardson, taken
together, require that each sub-element of the vileness aggravator upon
26. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.
27. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2360-62.
28. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
29. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999); see 18 U.S.C. S 2119 (Supp. V
1988).
30. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
31. Id. at 251. The Court stated that "the Government's view would raise serious
constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive. Any doubt on the issue of
statutory construction is hence to be resolved in favor of avoiding those questions.' Id.
32. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
33. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 824 (1999).
34. See id. at 818-20.
35. Id. at 817-18.
36. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
2000]
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which a capital jury may impose a death sentence be unanimously agreed
upon by the jury and be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. The Apprendi Decision
-A. Facts and Procedural Posture
In the early morning of December 22, 1994, Charles C. Apprendi, Jr.,
fired several shots into the home of an African-American family who had
moved into his previously all-white neighborhood. This was the fourth
occasion on which this particular home was fired upon. Apprendi later
admitted that he fired four or five shots into the home, and he made two
important statements. 7 In the first statement, Apprendi denied knowing
the family personally, "but because they are black in color he [did] not want
them in the neighborhood."38 Apprendi also stated that he was "just giving
them a message that they were in his neighborhood."39
Apprendi was charged under a twenty-two count indictment that
included charges relating to the shootings as well as numerous unlawful
'firearm possession charges.' Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
Apprendi pleaded guilty to three of the counts - two counts of second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of
third-degree unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon."' Based upon the
two statements made to the police, the State requested an enhanced sentence
under the New Jersey hate crime statute even though Apprendi was not
charged under that statute. 2
At a subsequent evidentiary hearing to determine the purpose of the
shootings, Apprendi presented a psychologist and seven character witnesses
37. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1999).
38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 486-87. Apprendi's indictment included charges related to the shootings for
attempted murder, attempted aggravated assault, and harassment. The possession charges
incuded possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, possession of a prohibited weapon,
and possession of a destructive device. Id.
41. Id. at 487. Under the agreement, the prohibited weapon sentence was to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed on the two other possession charges. The sentences
for the two other possession charges were reserved to the discretion of the trial court. Id.
42. Id. The New Jersey hate crime statute in effect at the time of Apprendi's sentencing
stated that a court may sentence a person convicted of certain crimes to "an extended term
if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, the grounds in subsection e." N.J. STAT. ANN.
S 2C: 44-3 (West 1995). Subsection (e) states the following: "The defendant in committing
the crime acted, at least in part, with ill will, hatred or bias toward, and with a purpose to
intimidate, an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, religion, sexual
orientation or ethnicity." NJ. STAT. ANN. S 2C: 44-3(e) (West 1995).
[Vol. 13:1
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who testified that Apprendi did not have a reputation for racial bias.
Denying that he was biased toward African-Americans, Apprendi testified
that the shootings resulted from the consumption of too much alcohol. He
further testified that his statements to the police had been mischaracterized.
The judge, however, relied upon the testimony of the police officer present
at questioning and found that the crime was motivated by racial bias.43
Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years on one of the second-degree unlaw-
ful purpose possession charges and two shorter concurrent sentences on the
remaining charges." Because the maximum for second-degree offenses was
ten years imprisonment, the twelve year sentence that Apprendi received
exceeded that maximum.4" The hate crime statute provided for a punish-
ment range between ten and twenty years imprisonment, which is the
ordinary range for a first-degree crime in New Jersey.' The hate crime
statute, in essence, sentenced crimes one degree higher by sentencing a
second-degree crime with a first-degree sentence.4"
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
found that the use of the preponderance standard to enhance Apprendi's
sentence did not violate Winship's mandate that the State prove each ele-
ment of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 The Appellate Division
reasoned that racial bias was not an element of the crime because the hate
crimes provision was included in a sdction of the New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice entitled "authority of court in sentencing.'" 49 Citing
McMillan, the court noted that the State's burden of proof on sentencing
factors is not subject to the reasonable doubt standard, because the sentenc-
ing factor at issue, the presence of racial bias, is not an element of the
crime.'
43. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (2000).
44. Id.
45. See NJ. STAT. ANN. 5 2C: 43-6(a)(2) (West 1995) (establishing the range of punish-
ment for second-degree offenses as between five and ten years imprisonment).
46. See NJ. STAT. ANN. S 2C: 43-6(a)(1) (West 1995) (establishing the range of punish-
ment for first-degree offenses as between ten and twenty years imprisonment).
47. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2363.
48. State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). As part
of the plea agreement, Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
hate crime statute. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 487 (N.J. 1999); see In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause mandates that defendants cannot
be convicted except upon proof of every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
49. Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1268 (internal citation omitted in original).
50. Id. (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)). In holding that
Pennsylvania's Mandatory Sentencing Act did not violate Winship and Mullaney, the
McMillan Court noted that "[sjentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found
2000]
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A divided New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed."' The court first noted
the language employed by the United States Supreme Court in the Jones
decision, which expressed significant doubt about the constitutionality of
allowing judges to determine penalty-enhancing findings by a preponderance
of the evidence. 2 The court then considered McMillan and decided that the
statute did not impose impermissible burden shifting or create a separate
offense with a separate penalty."3 Instead, the state legislature "simply took
one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on
punishment and dictated the weight to be given that factor."" Though the
hate crimes statute was unlike the statute at issue in McMillan in that it
increased the maximum penalty to which a defendant was subject, it was not
dear to the court that this would change the "constitutional calculus" of due
process."5
Thus, the question starkly presented to the United States Supreme
Court was how to reconcile the New Jersey hate crime statute with the
statute at issue in McMillan. The New Jersey hate crime statute provided for
enhancement of a sentence beyond the statutory maximum if the sentencing
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was moti-
vated by racial bias. s The statute challenged in McMillan established mini-
mum sentences for enumerated felonies if the sentencing judge found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a fire-
arm during the commission of the offense."7 McMillan skillfully avoided the
constitutional issues these sentencing factors presented by employing a
multi-factor test to assess whether Winship was violated." Would the
Apprendi Court also carefully circumvent the Winship and Mullaney man-
dates in favor of judicial discretion at sentencing?
[sentencing] facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
InApprendi, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey found the racial bias
component a sentencing factor and not an element of the crime. Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1268.
Thus, the hate crime sentencing factor was not subject to the reasonable doubt standard. Id.
51. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 486.
52. See id. at 493. TheJones Court noted that interpreting the federal carjacking statute
to allow judges to find penalty-enhancing factors by a standard less than reasonable doubt
"would raise serious constitutional questions." Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251
(1999).
53. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 494-95 (relying upon McMillan, 477 U.S. at 90-91).
54. Id. at 494-95.
55. Id. at 495.
56. See NJ. STAT. ANN. S 2C: 44-3 (West 1995).
57. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,81-82 (1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
9712(a), (b) (West 1998).
58. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-88; see infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
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B. Background: Jones v. United States and Richardson v. United States
The year before the United States Supreme Court consideredApprendi,
the Court deftly avoided the precise constitutional issues raised in Apprendi
in two companion cases that construed two federal criminal statutes. The
first case, Jones v. United States, involved the federal carjacking statute and
considered whether the carjacking statute defined three distinct offenses or
a single crime with three penalty options, two of which turned on factors
not considered by the jury. 9 The Court considered the language of the
carjacking statute as well as similar statutes and concluded that the statute
contained three separate offenses, not mere enhancements of a single of-
fense.' The Court noted that reading the statute as containing sentence
enhancements would raise serious constitutional issues.6' However, the
Court resolved its reading of the statute with the well-settled rule that
"where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."62
Similarly, in Richardson v. United States, the Supreme Court avoided
the constitutional implications raised by the federal continuing criminal
enterprise statute that included as an element that the defendant participated
in a "series of violations" of the federal drug laws.63 The issue was whether
59. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999). The federal carjacking statute, as
it appeared at the time Jones was arrested, stated the following:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 ofthis title, takes a motor
vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign
commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by
intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of
years up to life, or both.
18 U.S.C. S 2119 (Supp. V 1988). Congress subsequently amended this statute in'1994 and
1996. SeeJones, 526 U.S. at 230 n.1; 18 U.S.C. 5 2119 (Supp. IV 1998).
60. Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-39.
61. See id. at 239.
62. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909)); see Edward J. DeBartolo Cor. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (stating the construction rule that if an interpreta-
tion of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the statute should be interpreted
to avoid these constitutional concerns unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (same).
63. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818-20 (1999). The statute at issue
reads as follows:
(A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if-
(1)hie violates any provision of (the federal drug laws, i.e.,] of this subchapter
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the phrase "series of violations" referred to one element made up of several
possible sets of facts that a jury need not agree on, or whether the phrase
created several elements, each of which the jury must agree upon unani-
mously and separately.' Again, to avoid possible constitutional concerns,
the Court employed statutory construction principles to hold that the
statute defined separate elements that the jury must unanimously agree
upon.6 As in Jones, the Court pointed out the constitutional issues that
would arise if the statutory construction it employed was not possible, but
avoided them under the same avoidance principle articulated in Jones.6
With these two avoidance cases in its recent past, the Court granted certio-
rari in Apprendi.
67
C. The Apprendi Opinion
1. Historical Analysis
The Court began its analysis with a historical review of the two consti-
tutional rights at issue in A rendi. First, the Court recognized the right to
a jury trial as a centuries old right meant "'[t]o guard against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers."' 6' At the time of our Na-
tion's founding, this nght had come to be understood to require "'the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals and neighbours."'69
In the Court's view, the companion right to verdicts based upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was equally well founded in the common law.70
The Court noted that this higher degree of proof was found in ancient
2or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony and
) such violition is a part of a continuing series of violations of [the federal drug
laws, i.e.,] this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management,
. and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 U.S.C. S 848(c) (1994) (emphasis added):
64. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817-18.
65. See id. at 8 18-20.
66. Id. at 820 (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) ("It is our
settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional
issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.")).
67. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (mem.).
68. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (2000) (quoting 2 J. STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)).
69. Id. at 2356 (alteration in original) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)).
70. Id. at 2356.
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times, though its current form of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" did not
emere until the late eighteenth 
century.7  
.
the Court also noted that any distinction between elements of crimes
and mere sentencing factors was foreign to criminal procedure at the time
of our Nation's founding. 2 The substantive law imposed sentences, not the
judge; therefore, once the jury found a defendant guilty of a crime, the judge
simply imposed the sentence that was already prescribed by statute.' This
was not to say that judges lacked all discretion, but generally the judge was
bound to impose a sentence within the range provided by the substantive
law.'4
Lastly, the Court cited Winship and Mullaney for the proposition that
the common law reasonable doubt requirement has a vital roe in modern
criminal roceedings and that this protection extends to a defendant's
sentence. Mullaney also rejected the notion that states could avoid the
protection provided in Winship by "redefin[ing] the elements that constitute
different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent
of punishment."' 6 Yet, eleven years after the Mullaney decision, the Su-
preme Court condoned a similar labeling of sentencing factors in McMillan.'
2. Wagging the Dog and Avoiding Winship: McMillan v. Pennsylvania
andAlmendarez-Torres v. Unites States
The term "sentencing factor" was first used by the United States Su-
preme Court in McMillan v. Pennsylvania." Pennsylvania's Mndatory
71. Id. (citations omitted).
72. id.
73. See id. at 2356-57.
74. See id. at 2357. A sentencing judge might pardon the defendant if he found the
circumstances of the case demanded it or grant the defendantbenefit of clergy whereby the
defendant would be branded on the hand. For information regarding benefit of clergy and
its application in Virginia, see generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The "Law Only as an
Enemy: The Legiiimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 969, 1009-11 (1992).
75. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359-60; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-04 (1975);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Apprendi Court noted that the statute invali-
dated in Mullaney was unconstitutional because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
to the defendant. The statute presumed the presence of malice in all murders and placed the
burden of rebutting this presumption on the defendant. If the defendant -was unable to rebut
the presumption of malice, the defendant was subject to the greater punishment of life
imprisonment. If the defendant could prove a lesser degree of culpability, such as heat of
passion, the charge was reduced to manslaughter which carried a punishment of only twenty
years imprisonment. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359-60.
76. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.
77. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-91 (1986).
78. See id. at 89-90.
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Minimum Sentencing Act ("Act") provided that defendants convicted of
certain enumerated felonies were subject to a mandatory minimum sentence
of five years, imprisonment if the sentencing judge found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant had "visibly possessed a firearm"
during the commission of the offense. 9 The Act divested the judge of
discretion to impose a sentence of less than five years, but did not authorize
a sentence in excess of that otherwise allowed for the underlying felony."0
Petitioner McMillan argued that visible possession of a firearm in the
commission of an offense was an element of the crime and that it therefore
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship. 1 The United
States Supreme Court considered a number of factors in deciding that the
Act did not violate Winship.82 Of particular interest to the Court was the
fact that the Act did not allow imposition of a sentence greater than that
prescribed by statute for the underlying felony. The Court stated that
[s]ection 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime
committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate
penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion
in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it with-out the speciai finding of visible possession of a firearm.... The
statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the
visible possession finding to be a tai which wags the dog of the
sub~'antive offense. Petitioners' claim that visible possessionunder the Pennsylvania statute is 'really' an elementof the of-
fenses for which they are being punished - that Pennsylvania has
in effect defined a new set of upgraded felonies - would have at
least more superficial appeal i a finding of visible possessionexposed them to greater or additional punishment.. but it does
not.8'
The Court also reasoned that its decision in McMian was governed not by
Mulaney but by Patterson v. New York,84 which stressed the deference that
must be given to state legislatures to define crimes and administer justice.8
79. Id. at 81; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 9712(a), (b) (West 1998).
80. McMilan, 477 U.S. at 81-82.
8 1 . I.ed.a t 8 4 .
82. Md at 84-91.
83. Id. at 87-88.
84. 432 U.S. 1?97 (1977).85. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.s. 197, 205-11 (1977) (holding that a New York
statute that required defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affrnaxive
defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce a second-degree murder charge
to manslaughter did not violate the Due Process Clause because the State still had to prove
every element of second-degree murder).
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The Pennsylvania legislature was not circumventing the holdings of Winship
and Mullaney but was well within constitutional boundaries because it took
"one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on
punishment - the instrumentality used in committing a~iolent felony - and
dictated the precise weight to be given that factor if the instrumentality is
a firearm." 6 Thus, because the Act did not define an element and stayed
within statuiorily prescribed maximum punishments, the Court concluded
that the Act fell on the "permissible side of the constitutional line.""
In describing the McMillan decision, the Apprendi Court quickly
enumerated the following two important principles from which- the
McMillan Court did not budge: "(1) constitutional limits. exist to States'
authority to define away facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense; and
(2) that a state scheme that keeps from the jury facts that 'expos[e] [defen-
dants] to greater or additional punishment,' may raise serious constitutional
concern. 8  With these principles in mind, the Apprendi Court limited the
McMillan decision to meet concerns from the dissenters that the majority
was overruling McMillan." McMillan was limited to cases in which the
sentence imposed did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty available
for that offense.'
Having disposed of the problematic McMillan decision, the Apprendi
Court then directed its attention to the next problem, Almendarez.Torres v.
United States.9' Petitioner Almendarez-Torres, an alien, pleaded guilty to re-
entering the United States without the permission of the Attorney General
in violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1326(a), an offense that carries a maximum punish-
ment of two years imprisonment.' Almendarez-Torres, however, received
86. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90.
87. Id. at 91.
88. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2360 (alteration in original) (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at
85-88) (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 2361 n.13. The dissenting Justices made two objections to the majority's
limitation of McMillan. See id. at 2385-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). First, the dissent read
the majority opinion as requiring any factor that increased or altered punishment be proven
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. To the dissenters, McMillan had already rejected this
rule; therefore the majority should have overruled McMillan. Id. at 2385. Second, the dissent
viewed Patterson's deference to legislative definitions of crimes as the guiding principle in
McMillan, at least to the extent it avoided the constitutional issues raised in McMiUan.
Therefore, because McMillan relied in large part on legislative deference, the majority's
limitation of McMillan was inadequate because it failed to accommodate this deference
rationale. Id. at 2386.
90. Id. at 2361 n.13.
91. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
92. Id. at 227; see 8 U.S.C. S 1326(a) (Supp. IV 1988). Section 1326(a) states that
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a sentence of seven years and one month after the judge determined that
Petitioner was also in violation of section 1326(b)." 3 Section 1326(b) autho-
rizes a prison sentence of up to twenty years for any alien in violation of
subsection (a) whosG initial deportation was due to an aggravated felony
conviction." Petitioner appealed with a claim that his indictment was
deficient because it failed to allege every fact of the crime for which he was
charged; the indictment failed to allege that Petitioner's prior deportation
was due to an aggravated felony conviction." The United States Supreme
Court rejected Petitioner's claim, finding that the aggravated felony convic-
tion lacking in the indictment was a sentencing factor and not a separate
element." Because an indictment need only allege the elements of the crime
for which it charges and not sentencing factors, the government was not
required to charge the aggravated felony conviction in the indictment.97
The Apprendi Court disposed of Almendarez-Torres on two grounds.
First, the Court viewedAlmendarez-Torres as answering only the sufficiency
of the indictment question and therefore not implicating Winsbip at all.
[S]entencing [Almendarez-Torres] to a term higher than that
attached to the offense alleged in the indictment did not violate
the strictures of Winsbip .... Because Almendarez-Torres had
admitted the three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies - all
of which had been entered pursuant to proceedings with substan-
tial procedural safeguards of their own - no question concerning
the iight to a jury tial or the standard of proof that would apply
any alien who-
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed
the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is
outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States, unless
(A) prior to is reembarkation at a place outside te United States or his
application for admission from foreign contigu ous territory the Attorney
General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying or admission;
or
(B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless
such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance
consent under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under Title 18,
or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
S1326(a).
93. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27; see 8 U.S.C. S 1326(b) (Supp. IV 1988).
94. S 1326(b).
95. Almendarez.Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
96. Id. at 235, 243-47.
97. Id. at 226-28. The Court stated that while indictments must "set forth each element
of the crime that it charges," they need not set forth "factors relevant only to the sentencing
of an offender." Id. at 228 (citation omitted).
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to a contested issue of fact was before the [Almendarez-Torres]
Court.98
Second, the Apprendi Court recognized that the Almendarez-Torres holding
was largely based on the fact that the increased punishment was due to the
prior commission of a serious felony." The Court employed the following
description of Almendarez- Torres fromJones: "[A]s Jones made crystal clear,
our conclusion in Almendarez.Torres turned heavily upon the fact that the.
additional sentence to which the defendant was subject was 'the prior
commission of a serious crime. ' ""
More importantly, theApprendi Court characterizedAlmendarez-Torres
as "at best an exceptional departure" from the traditions of Winship and
Mullaney.'0 ' Because Almendarez-Torres was limited to the question of
recidivist statutes and whether prior convictions were required to be recited
in indictments, it did not affect the general rule explained by the Apprendi
Court that a jury must find every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. 2 Like McMillan, Almendarez-Torres was not overruled but merely
narrowed in applicability.
3. Holding and Application
Having concluded its historical analysis and disposing of some question-
able cases, the Court was ready to announce its holding and apply it to the
New Jersey statute in question. Recognizing that Almendarez-Torres carved
out an exception for recidivist provisions, the Court held that
[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule
set forth in the concurring opinions in Uones]: '[Ilt is unconstitu-
tional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
98. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361.
99. Id. at 2361-62.
100. Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230). The Atpndi majority did note
that there was some disagreement in Almendarez. Torres over whether the decision should be
restricted to recidivism provisions. The Apprendi majority stated that "'[t]he majority and
dissenters in Almendarez-Torres disagreed over the legitimacy of the Court's decision to
restrict its holding to recidivism, but both sides agreed the Court had done just that.'" Id. at
2362 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 249 n.10).
101. Id. at 2361.
102. Id. at 2361-62.
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criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts
must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.""
The Court then applied its holding to the New Jersey hate crime
statute. Rejecting New Jersey's claim that the statute identified motive only
and not an element of the crime, the Court concluded that the defendant's
state of mind was at issue in proving bias and that intent was indeed an
element."° The Court then reasoned that the labeling of a factor as an
element or a sentence enhancement is irrelevant; it is the effect of the factor
that is important.01 The effect of the hate crime provision is to elevate an
otherwise second-degree offense to one of first-degree, which directly
conflicts with Winship and Mullaney! 6
D. The Walton Paragraph
The final paragraph of the majority opinion in Apprendi addresses
Walton v. Arizona. In Walton, the United States Supreme Court held that
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme did not run afoul of the Constitution.s
Arizona permitted the imposition of death sentences by judges after a judge
determined the presence of applicable aggravators and weighed them against
the proffered mitigators in a separate sentencing hearing. "
In affirming Walton's death sentence, the Court held that the aggrava-
tors were not "elements" and therefore need not be proven to a jury."0
Instead, the aggravators were merely, "'standards to guide the making of
[the] choice between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprison-
ment. ' ' M The Court then concluded that placing the burden on the defen-
dant to establish mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evi-
103. Id. at 2362-63 (quotingJones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
104. Id. at 2364. In the Court's view, a defendant's intent in committing a crime is
"perhaps as dose as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense 'element.'" Id.
105. Id. at 2365.
106. Id.; seesupra notes 44-47 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the New
Jersey hate crime statute sentenced crimes one degree higher.
107. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
108. Id. at 647-56.
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-703(B) (West 1989).
110. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648-49. Walton was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death after the trial judge found two aggravators and concluded that the offered
mitigators did not warrant leniency. Id. at 645. The aggravators found by the judge were the
following: "(1) [t]he murder was committed 'in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved
manner,'... and (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain." Id. at 645 (quoting ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-703(F)(6), (F)(5) (West 1989)) (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 648 (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986)) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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dence did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the
State's burden of proving the aggravating circumstances remained intact.'
Finally, the Court rejected Walton's claim that the "heinous, cruel or
depraved" aggravator failed to channel the sentencer.s discretion as required
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."' The Court distinguished
between death sentences imposed by a jury and those imposed by a judge.
When a jury is the final sentencer it is essential that the jurors be
properly instructed regardin all ?acets of the sentencing process.
It is not enough to instruct the jury in the bare terms of an aggra-
vating circumstance that is unconstitutionally vague on its face..
.. But th[is] logic... has no place in the context of sentencing by
a trial judge. Trial judges are presumed to know. the law and to
apply it in making their decisions." 4
Because the Arizona Supreme Court had narrowed the definition of "hei-
nous, cruel or depraved," the Supreme Court presumed the that Arizona
trial judges were applying the narrower definition.'
The Apprendi Court employed the Walton decision to dispose of a
possible argument that the Apprendi rule would render invalid state capital
sentencing schemes that allow a judge, after a jury verdict on a capital crime,
-to impose a death sentence by finding aggravating factors." 6 The Court
then cited a footnote from the dissent in Almendarez-Torres to support this
proposition.
'Neither the cases cited, nor any other case, permits a judge to
determine the existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital
offense. What the cited cases hold is that, once a jury has found
the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries
as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the
judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a
lesser one, ought to be imposed."'
7
With this footnote from a dissenting opinion, thenApprendi Court attempted
to dismiss any argument that the rule articulated in Apprendi applied to
sentencing factors used in capital sentencing schemes.
112. Id. at 649-51.
113. Id. at 652-56.
114. Id. at 653.
115. Id.
116. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2366.




However, what the Apprendi Court failed to note is that most states,
including Virginia, leave the capital sentencing decision in the hands of the
jury."' Thus, the rationale that guided Walton is not applicable in jury
sentencing states. As noted above, the Walton decision rested in part on the
fact that trial judges are "pFresumed to know the law and to apply it in
making their decisions."" This presumption is simply not present in
sentencing schemes in which the jury makes the determination between a
sentence of life and of death. Thus, the attempt of the Apprendi Court to
prevent challenges to state capital sentencing. schemes is thwarted by the
limited application of Walton. For these reasons, the Apprendi decision may
be employed to challenge aspects of Virginia's capital sentencing scheme.
IlL Unanimity and a Standard of Prooffor the Vileness Sub-Elements
A. Jones, Richardson, and Apprendi Require Unanimity for the Vileness
Sub-Elements and Proof of the Sub-Elements Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
1. The Trilogy of Opinions
The companion cases of Jones and Richardson must be read along with
Apprendi as a trilogy in order to appreciate the significant and broad effect
of Apprendi. Jones left unresolved the constitutional issues implicated by the
sentencing enhancements found in the federal carjacking statute. 2 The
Jones Court did not address whether a defendant could receive an enhanced
sentence by factors proven only by a preponderance of the evidence instead
of proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' Apprendi answered this issue left
unsettled in Jones and established the principle that any fact that increases
the statutorily prescribed maximum penalty, other than a prior conviction,
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'22
The Richardson Court similarly refused to address the constitutional
questions. raised by the continuing criminal enterprise statute." The
Richardson Court refused to determine whether a guilty verdict based on
any number of underlying violations upon which the jury did not unani-
mously agree would comport with the Constitution. The constitutional
issue was whether lack of unanimity by the jury as to which violations of
118. See VA: CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 to -264.4 (Michie 2000).
119. Walton, 497 U.S. at 653.
120. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232-39 (1999); see supra notes 59-62 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Jones opinion.
121. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 238-52.
122. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
123. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 818-20 (1999); see supra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Richardson opinion.
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the crime form the basis of its verdict violates fundamental notions of
fairness and a tradition of jury unanimity. 124 Like Jones, Richardson avoided
these larger constitutional issues.
Jones, Richardson, and Apprendi must be read as a trilogy. Jones and
Richardson both construed federal statutes to avoid the constitutional issues
involved. Apprendi answered the issues left unresolved in Jones. This
decision foreshadows a similar treatment of the issues left unaddressed in
Richardson.2 ' Because the Apprendi Court finally dealt with the troubling
issues presented in Jones, one can presume that the Supreme Court will
likewise address the unresolved issues from Richardson when those issues are
next presented to Court. The similarities of Jones and Richardson, and the
Apprendi Court's resolution of the Jones issues, indicate that the Richardson
issues will be resolved in the same manner. Thus, by reading these cases as
a trilogy, a prediction may be made as to how the Supreme Court will
decide the issues left unaddressed in Richardson.
2. Richardson Requires Unanimity and Elevates the
Vileness Sub-Elements to Elements
The Richardson opinion is significant for two reasons. The specific
holding of Richardson implies the vileness sub-elements must be found
unanimously."2 6 But the broader implication of Richardson is more impor-
tant. In essence, Richardson elevates the sub-elements of vileness to the
stature of elements. Because the sub-elements are elements under Richard-
son, Apprendi applies and requires the elements be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt.The application of Richardson's specific holding to Virginia's capital
sentencing scheme requires that the vileness sub-element used to impose a
death sentence be agreed upon by the jury unanimously.'27 The Virginia
124. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818-20.
125. See discussion infra Part III(A)(2).
126. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 824 (holding the continuing criminal enterprise statute
contains several elements, namely the drug violations, each of which the jury must unani-
mously agree upon).
127. A careful reading of Richardson reveals that the decision seems to limit itself to only
guilt-innocence determinations. See id. at 818-19. The Court stated that "[t]o hold each
'violation' here amounts to a separate element is consistent with a tradition of requiring jury
unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the
law." Id. at 818 (emphasis added). This possible limitation on the holding of Richardson is
obviated by the United State Supreme Court's conclusion that, for constitutional purposes,
a penalty phase of a capital trial is procedurally indistinguishable from the guilt-innocence
phase. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,438 (1981) ('The [capital] presentence hearing
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capital sentencing scheme provides three possible sub-elements which a jury
must find, alone or in combination, in order to find vileness and recom-
mend that the defendant be sentenced to death. These factors are torture,
depravity of mind, and aggravated battery.128 These factors need not be
considered in detail by the jury; it is only necessary that it unanimously
agrees that the murder involved either torture or depravity of mind or
aggravated battery.2 "
Richardson involved a similar situation. The continuing criminal
enterprise statute in Richardson mandated that the jury find the defendant
guilty of a series of violations while not agreeing as to which violations the
defendant actually committed. 3 This is the precise situation presented to
a capital jury in Virginia. The jury may make a finding of vileness without
unanimity as to which sub-element is pregent; only the general finding of
vileness need be agreed upon unanimously."' The Richardson Court's
holding that the jury must fid unanimously which of the offered violations
form the basis of its guilty verdict, mandates that a Virginia jury unani-
mously agree as to which sub-element formed the basis of its finding of
vileness.
In addition, Richardson serves to elevate the sub-elements of vileness to
the stature of elements. The Richardson Court found that the continuing
criminal enterprise statute contained not one element, but separate elements
upon which the jury must unanimously agree.' The Court's statutory
construction allowed the Court to avoid the constitutional issues. However,
before avoiding these issues, the Court discussed two considerations regard-
resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the
issue of guilt or innocence."); see also Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127 (1991) (finding
capital sentencing proceedings sufficiently similar to guilt-innocence trials in adversarial
format and in standards governing decision-making so that guarantees of fairness and due
process apply to capital sentencing proceedings). Because the two proceedings are procedur-
ally indistinguishable, rights that extend to defendants at the guilt-innocence phase extend to
the sentencing phase as well. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-11 (1967) (holding that
due process protections such as the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the
right to present favorable evidence must be available at sentencing hearings because sentences
offe sed uon an additional finding of fact that was not originally an element of theoffensechre.
128. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000).
129. See Banghart, supra note 4, at 98 (explaining that a Virginia capital jury need not
unanimously agree upon one vileness factor at sentencing; it is only necessary that it agree
that one or more of the factors are present).
130. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816.
131. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000).
132. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 824.
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ing the issues.' It is these two considerations that extend Richardson
beyond its specific holding and imply that the vileness sub-elements are
actually elements.
These constitutional considerations involve due process guarantees, the
right to a fair trial, and the right to a fair and impartial jury. First, the
Richardson Court reasoned that treatingthe violations as alternative means
would increase the likelihood of "permitting a jury to avoid discussion of
the specific factual details of each violation," and allow for the "cover-up [of]
wide disagreement among the jurors about just what the defendant did, or
did not, do."134 Second, and as a corollary to the first consideration, the
Court recognized the aggravated risk when multiple means are involved that
the "jurors, unless required to focus upon specific factual detail, will fail to
do so, simply concluding from testimony.., that where there is smoke
there must be fire." 3'
The same constitutional considerations are implicated in the Virginia
capital sentencing scheme when a jury is permitted to issue a death sentence
based upon the vileness aggravator. If the jury is permitted, as it is now, to
find vileness without agreement as to which element forms the basis of its
finding, the jury will not sufficiently consider the factual details of the crime
or of each element. Further, because the jury may gloss over the factual
details of the crime and the elements of vileness, the jury may draw imper-
missible inferences. Without proper consideration of the details of the
crime, the jury will draw on other evidence introduced at sentencing to
impose a death penalty. For example, some particularly damaging victim
impact testimony might sway a jury to find depravity of mind present;
though the proper inquiry to establish this element is a factual consideration
of the crime, not the victim's testimony about the impact of the crime.
136
133. Id. at 819.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. There is no standard in Virginia for finding the depravity of mind sub-element.
See Banghart, supra note 4, at 87-90. The few Virginia decisions to consider the depravity of
mind sub-element in detail have affirmed the finding of depravity of mind solely on the facts
of the murder. The cases merely conclude on the facts presented that the jury could have
reasonably found depravity of mind was present to support their finding of vileness. Id.; see
Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 832-33 (Va. 1985); Sheppard v. Commonwealth,
464 S.E.2d 131, 139 (Va. 1995). For a detailed discussion of the irrelevancy of victim impact
evidence in the Virginia capital sentencing context, see generally Matthew L. Engle, Due
Process Limitations on Victim Impact Evidence, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (2000) (arguing that victim
impact evidence is not relevant to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the
Virginia capital sentencing scheme). For a review of the insufficiencies of the current
Virginia Model Jury Instructions on vileness, see generally Melissa A. Ray, "Meaningful
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The same constitutional issues raised by the continuing criminal enterprise
statute in Richardson are implicated when a capital jury finds vileness with-
out agreeing unanimously upon the underlying element.
At this point, reading Jones, Richardson and Apprendi as a trilogy
becomes especially helpful. Because Apprendi addressed the unanswered
constitutional issues in Jones, the issues raised in Richardson will likely be
resolved in the same fashion as soon as a similar Richardson unanimity issue
is presented to the United States Supreme Court. Apprendi foreshadows
Richardson's constitutional answers.
Because the two constitutional considerations of Richardson are impli-
cated by the vileness sub-elements, and because reading Jones, Richardson,
and Apprendi as a trilogy suggests that Richardson's holding will be affirmed,
it seems likely that the vileness sub-elements will also be read as elements.
The specific holding of Richardson requires the vileness sub-elements be
found unanimously. However, the Richardson opinion actually goes farther
and serves to elevate the sub-elements to elements. This latter application
of Richardson is crucial to applying Apprendi to the Virginia capital sentenc-
ing scheme.
3. Apprendi Requires Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubtfor
the Vileness Sub-Elements
The application of Apprendi to the Virginia capital sentencing scheme
turns on the limit in the Apprendi holding that the sentencing factor must
extend the punishment beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum. "7 The
Court stated this limitation clearly by saying that "[o]ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."' There are two alternative ways to apply
Apprendi with the maximum sentence limitation to Virginia capital trials,
but both result in the requirement that the vileness elements be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.'39 A third application of Apprendi ignores this
requirement entirely, but also requires the vileness elements be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 40
Guidance.• Reforming Virginia sModelJury Instructions on Vdeness and Future Dangerousness,
13 CAP. DEF. J. 85 (2000) (proposing amendments to the Virginia Model Jury Instruction on
vileness including a better definition for the depravity of mind sub-element).
137. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. See discussion infra Parts ll(A)(3)(a) and (b).
140. See discussion infra Part mI(A)(3)(c).
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a. The Statutory Maximum in Virginia is Life Imprisonment and Apprendi
Requires that the Finding ofa n Aggravator Which Increases this Maximum
Punishment to Death be Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The first way to apply the Apprendi decision is a strict statutory con-
struction. A sentence of death may not be imposed in Virginia unless one
of the two statutory aggravators is found by the jury; if the jury cannot find
one of the aggravators present, it must impose a life sentence.'41 Viewed in
this manner, the aggravators increase the statutorily presumed punishment
of life imprisonment. Thus, because the aggravators increase the punish-
ment beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum of life imprisonment, the
holding of Apprendi is directly applicable. Apprendi requires that the
sentence enhancement (the statutory aggravator) which increases the punish-
ment beyond the statutory maximum of life imprisonment be found beyond
a reasonable doubt.'42 However, the statutory aggravators must already be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in Virginia, therefore Apprendi alone
does not make any significant difference to the capital sentencing scheme of
Virginia.'43 However, Richardson served to elevate the vileness sub-elements
to elements.1" Therefore, the statutory aggravator of vileness as well as the
underlying element that supports that finding must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, Richardson andApprendi require at least one of the
vileness sub-elements to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the
finding of vileness increases the punishment beyond the statutory maximum
of life imprisonment.
An understanding of the statutes at issue in Jones and Apprendi is vital
to this application of Apprendi to the Virginia capital sentencing scheme.
The Apprendi Court considered New Jersey's hate crime statute and the
unlawful possession of a firearm statute to which the bias enhancement was
applied. 45 The possession charge plus the finding of a biased intention
resulted in an enhanced sentence. ~ Because the hate crime statute increased
the maximum punishment applicable to the possession charge, the Apprendi
141. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000); see also VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-
264.4(E) (Michie 2000) ("In the event the jury cannot agree as to the penalty, the court shall
dismiss the jury, and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.").
142. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
143. SeeS 19.2-264.4(C) ("The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Common-
wealth shall prove beyonda reasonable doubt that... [the defendant's] conduct in committing
the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.") (emphasis added).
144. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
145. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352-53.
146. Id. at 2352.
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Court concluded that the hate crime statute impermissibly sentenced a
defendant without a reasonable doubt guarantee, or even a jury determina-
tion, of the presence of the biased intention. 47
In contrast, Jones involved one statute, the federal carjacking statute.14
This statute provided a base punishment (up to fifteen years imprisonment)
for the carjacking offense, but then increased the punishment to a possible
twenty-five years imprisonment if serious bodily injury resulted, or a
possible life imprisonment sentence if death resulted."4' The Jones Court
held that this statute contained three separate and distinct offenses so that
the additional factors of serious bodily injury or death of a victim had to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury." But, like the statute in
Apprendi, the punishment for the underlying crime, carjacking, increased
with the finding of an additional factor - serious bodily injury or death of
the victim. 1 Though Jones involved a single statute that provided both the
underlying crime and the enhancement factors and Apprendi involved two
statutes, the patten of punishment is the same: an underlying crime plus
another factor results in punishment greater than the maximum applicable
for the underlying crime.
The Virginia capital sentencing scheme invokes this same pattern."2
The jury finds a defendant guilty of capital murder. 3 This crime carries a
maximum punishment of life imprisonment without parole." If, and only
if, the jury finds one of the statutory aggravators present, the jury is permit-
ted to increase the punishment beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum
of life imprisonment and impose a death sentence. Thus, the pattern
remains the same: an underlying crime plus an additional factor permits a
sentence beyond that available for the underlying crime. Because Apprendi
held that this pattern was unacceptable unless the jury found the presence
of the additional factor, and further found it beyond a reasonable doubt, the
147. Id. at 2362-66.
148. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999); 18 U.S.C. S 2119 (Supp. V
1988).
149. S 2119.
150. SeeJones, 526 U.S. at 251-52.
151. See id. at 230; S 2119.
152. See S 19.2-264.4.
153. Id.
154. VA. CODEANN. 5 18.2-10 (Michie 1996). Section 18.2-10(a) defines punishment for
Class 1 felonies as "death, or imprisonment for life, and... a fine of not more than $100,000."
S 18.2-10(a). Capital murder is a Class 1 felony in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31
(Michie 1996).
155. SS 19.2-264.4(c), 19.2-264.2.
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Apprendi statute violated the Due Process Clause. The Virginia vileness
factor similarly will violate the Due Process Clause under the holding of
Apprendi unless the jury is instructed to find the vileness sub-element
beyond a reasonable doubt.
b. Choosing Between Life and Death as Punishment is Radically Different
from Choosing Among a Range of Punishments; Therefore the Protections
Apprendi Contemplates Are Applicable
An alternate application of Apprendi with its statutorily prescribed
maximum limitation is also possible. The Virginia capital sentencing statute
may alternatively be read to establish death as the maximum sentence
possible for capital murder.sa This reading of the statute makes Apprendi
inapplicable at first glance, because the vileness aggravator under this reading
does not extend the sentence beyond its statutorily prescribed maximum;
rather, such finding brings the punishment to its statutory prescribed maxi-
mum. However, a comparison between the Apprendi sentencing range and
the capital sentencing choice in Virginia coupled with a close reading of the
Apprendi opinion reveals that Apprendi is applicable to the vileness aggrava-
tor and demands the vileness sub-elements be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Unlike the sentencing range available in Apprendi, the sentence
possible for a capital murder conviction in Virginia is not a range at all. The
only possible sentences are death and life imprisonment." No other
alternatives are available." 8 Thus, sentencing a capital crime in Virginia is
not a decision within a range; it is a choice. A capital jury must choose
between life and death. However, this choice can only be made upon the
156. See S 18.2-10(a).
157. Id.
158. See id. For capital murders committed after 1995, life imprisonment means life in
prison without parole. Prior to 1995, the Virginia Code denied a defendant parole in two
instances. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-151 (Michie 1999). A defendant was parole ineligible
if convicted of a third rape, murder or robbery (or any combination of these three) so long
as the third crime was not part of the same act or transaction. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-15I(B1)
(Michie 1999). A defendant was also parole ineligible if paroled from a previous life sentence
and then sentenced to life imprisonment again for the commission of a second crime. VA.
CODE ANN. S 53.1-151(E) (Michie 1999). The General Assembly of Virginia subsequently
abolished parole for all felony offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995. VA. CODE
ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999). Geriatric parole is available to convicted felons except
those convicted of capital murder. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (Michie 1999). Capital
murders committed after 1995 are therefore not parole eligible crimes, and the only two
punishment options for capital murder convictions are death and life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.
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finding of one of the statutory aggravators."s9 Thus, for a capital jury, an
additional element, one of the aggravators, must be proven before the choice
whether to impose a death sentence may be considered at all.
The stark choice between life and death that a capital jury faces is
fundamentally different from the choice a judge or jury makes within a
sentencing range of a number of years of imprisonment. In Specbt v.
Patterson," the Supreme Court considered a Colorado felony sentencing
scheme that subjected sexual offenders, normally facing a maximum penalty
of ten years imprisonment, to a possibility of life imprisonment if a judge
found that the defendant posed a threat of "bodily harm to members of the
public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill." 6 The Supreme Court
found that this scheme failed to satisfy requirements of due process because
the defendant was denied a host of rights at sentencing." The Court noted
that the scheme placed the defendant in a "radically different situation" from
the usual sentencing proceeding.' 63
Because the jury's sentencing choice is limited to life and death, a
capital defendant is placed in a "radically different situation" than non-
capital felony defendants. A capital defendant faces a radically different
situation from every other type of felon because only capital defendants
may be killed by the state. This poignant difference means that the choice
a capital sentencing jury faces subjects the defendant to the rule of Apprendi.
The protections provided in Apprendi are aimed at preventing defendants
from receiving punishment without due process of law. The same
protections are certainly implicated when the possible sentence is death.
The choice between death and life is a radically different situation from the
discretion to impose a number of years of imprisonment within a sentencing
range.
Apprendi is therefore applicable because the same protections guaran-
teed in Apprendi are also implicated in the Virginia capital sentencing
scheme. Like the first application of Apprendi, this application relies on the
elevation of the sub-elements to the stature of elements under the Richardson
decision. Richardson implies that the sub-elements are elements; Apprendi
requires that the elements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Apprendi Court's consistent treatment of the reasonable doubt requirement
159. See S 19.2-264.4.
160. 386 U.s. 605 (1967).
161. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 607 (1967).
162. Id. at 610-11. At sentencing, the defendant was denied the rights to counsel, to be
heard, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to offer his own evi-
dence. Id. at 608.
163. Id.
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as a respected tradition that applies to guilt-innocence determinations and
sentencing proceedings alike, adds credibility to this application of Apprendi.
The general protections Apprendi contemplates are undisturbed by this
application, and yet still require that the vileness sub-elements be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
c. History Remains: The Historical Analysis ofApprendi Requires that the
Vileness Sub-Elements be Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
A final application of Apprendi to the Virginia capital sentencing
scheme is possible. This application avoids the limitation of the statutorily
prescribed maximum by disposing of the case the Court relied on to create
this limitation. This application is a return to the historical principles
previously recognized in Winship and Mullaney.
The Apprendi Court began its historical analysis with the following
summary of the rights implicated in the case:
At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing
importance: the proscription of deprivation of liberty without
'due process of law,' and the guarantee that '[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial ury.' Taken tog&her, these rights indisput-
ably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he]
is guilty of every element of the crime ror which he is charged,
beyond a reasonable doubt." '4
After conducting a thorough historical review of the two rights listed above,
the Court concluded that the two rights are fundamental 65 This conclusion
made obvious to the Court the novelty of a system that removes from the
jury the determination of facts that expose the defendant to a penalty that
exceeds the statutory maximum.'66 Armed with these fundamental rights
and the opinions that establish and affirm them, Winship and Mullaney, the
Court then turned to its recent decisions interpreting sentencing factors,
McMillan and Almendarez- Torres.
ConsideringAlmendarez-Torres first, the Court was troubled by the fact
that the Almendarez-Torres decision found prior convictions to be a "tradi-
tional" basis upon which a court increases an offender's sentence.'67 The
Apprendi Court reconciled this traditional sentencing factor with the funda-
mental rights at issue in Apprendi by carving out an exception for prior
164. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2355-56 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
165. See id. at 2359.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2361-62; see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998).
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convictions.'" The Apprendi Court was comforted by the fact that the prior
convictions were proven beyond a reasonable doubt on a prior occasion.
Apparently, this was the redeeming fact for the Almendarez-Torres opinion.
The McMillan decision, however, was a bigger hurdle and did not
survive as easily. McMillan finessed the Winsbip-Mullaney rule in holding
that the Pennsylvania statute did not violate constitutional guarantees. But
it is important to note that McMillan rested in large part on Patterson v. New
York.169 Patterson noted that, even after Winsbip, a state legislature is enti-
tled to substantial deference in denoting what facts must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt by defining those facts as elements. 70 A state legislature's
decision to define factors as elements or as defenses is "not subject to pro-
scription under the Due Process Clause unless 'it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. '""' McMillan extended this deference rationale to
a state's definition of a sentencing factor. 2 Like Apprendi, the McMillan
decision claimed to be grounded in traditional rights and principles of
justice.'73 What, then, kept the Apprendi Court from overruling McMillan
and returning entirely to the constitutional principles established in Winsbip
and Mullaney? The answer is the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 74
Thus, the Court's holding protected the McMillan and Almendarez-
Torres opinions and avoided questioning the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
However, assume the Court did not have the albatross of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines with which to contend. If the Court did not need to
protect the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and if the historical analysis in
Apprendi was as important to the Court as its length and depth suggests, the
departure from these historical traditions inMcMfilan andAlmendarez-Torres
168. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
169. See McMilan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84-88 (1986); Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
170. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210-11 & 211 n.12.
171. Id. at 201-02 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U-S. 513, 523 (1958)).
172. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86.
173. See id. at 89-91.
174. See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2366 n.21. In a footnote, the majority noted that the
dissent questioned at length the effect the majority's decision would have on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. The majority avoided the issue by stating that the Guidelines were
not before the court and therefore would not be considered. Id. The majority avoided the
constitutional implications of its decision on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because the
implications would place the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in serious
doubt. Id. at 2391-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see 28 U.S.C. S§ 991-998 (1988); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1999).
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might have led to their overruling."' 5  Without the McMillan and
AlmendarezTorres opinions, what remains of the Apprendi opinion is its
lengthy historical analysis.
This historical analysis is largely a reaffirmation of the principles
established in Winsbip and Mullaney."6 A return to the once-settled princi-
ples of Winsbip and Mullaney would produce the same result that the first
two applications of the Apprendi opinion present. Winship held that the
Due Process Clause requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which a defendant may be
charged."r Mullaney held that a state cannot avoid the rule of Winsbip by
redefining elements of different crimes as factors that bear solely on punish-
ment.' Further, Mullaney extended the rationale of W'insbip to sentencing
proceedings."
The application of Winship and Mullaney to the Virginia capital sen-
tencing scheme requires the vileness elements be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. Because Richardson implied the sub-elements of vileness are
elements, the elements of vileness must therefore be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt under Winsbip and Mullaney. Further, Mullaney stands for
the proposition that a state cannot avoid Winsbip by merely redefining
elements that affect punishment as sentencing factors.' 0 Thus, labeling the
elements of vileness as sub-elements does not avoid the protections of
Winsbip simply because they are not called elements.
This final application of the Apprendi opinion illustrates Apprendi's
flaws. If McMillan and Almendarez-Torres are purged from the majority
opinion because the majority keeps these opinions simply to avoid address-
ing the legitimacy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the remainder of
the opinion is the historical analysis reaffirming the principles established
in Winsbip and Mullaney. This illustrates that McMilan and Almendarez-
Torres were ripe for overruling.
Whichever application is employed, the Apprendi,Jones, andRichardson
trilogy requires that the vileness elements be proven beyond a reasonable
175. It is arguable, however, that the Almendarez-Torres Court's finding that prior
convictions are a "traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's
increasing an offender's sentence," would have salvaged the Almendarez-Torres opinion.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998). A similar argument is not
present for the McMillan decision.
176. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
177. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
178. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975).
179. See id. at 698-701.
180. Id. at 698.
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doubt and found unanimously by the jury. This ensures capital defendants
the right to a fair trial and the guarantee of due process. Though the hold-
ings of these cases seem limited, read collectively they offer serious potential
for reforming the Virginia capital sentencing scheme with regards to the
vileness aggravator. These decisions combined with other favorable United
States Supreme Court case law suggest that these reforms are not only
possible, but probable.
B. Statutory Construction and Supreme Court Capital Jurisprudence Further
Support Requiring Unanimity and Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt for the
Vileness Elements'
1. Statutory Construction ofSection 19.2-264.2 Reveals that the
Sub-Elements are Elements
The rules of statutory construction strengthen Richardson's application
which elevates the sub-elements of the vileness aggravator to elements. The
applicable construction rule is that when a criminal statute describes in the
disjunctive how a crime may be committed, the words contained in that
description are elements, not means.' This rule presumes that when a
legislature describes specifically how a crime may be committed, the de-
scribed actions constitute the crime."8 3 For example, the common law
definition. of robbery requires "'taking by force or threat of force.'"'8 4 The
elements are the taking by use of force or threat of force, not whether the
defendant used a knife or gun during his robbery.'
Applying this rule to the vileness aggravator, the Virginia General
Assembly is presumed to have decided that what is important in a vileness
analysis is whether the defendant's conduct evidenced torture, depravity of
mind or aggravated battery.3 6 The General Assembly was not concerned
with how these sub-elements were accomplished, but only that one of them
was present.' Considering the heightened standard of reliability that
governs capital cases and the General Assembly's explicit description of
181. This section does not involve analysis of the Apprendi decision. The section
outlines additional reasons supporting the argument of this artide, namely that the vileness
factors need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and found unanimously. These
alternate reasons might be employed by defense counsel to bolster a motion for unanimity
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the vileness factors.
182. See Banghart, supra note 4, at 99.
183. Id. at 100.
184. Id. at 99-100 (internal citation omitted in original).
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,vileness, one can presume the description encompasses elements and not
simply means."'
2. The Need for Clear and Objective Standards
In Godfrey v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court considered
Georgia's vileness aggravator which is identical to Virginia's vileness aggra-
vator. 8 9 The Court struck down the use of this aggravator because it did
not limit adequately the jury's discretion in determining if the crime com-
mitted had been vile."9 The Court stated that a capital sentencing scheme
"must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards'
that provide 'specific and detailed guidance. '""' The sentencing jury in
Godfrey imposed a death sentence based upon only a finding that the crime
was "'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman."' This
general finding of outrageous or wanton vileness was reversed, because the
finding lacked guidance from the trial court and did not evidence any
inherent restraint on the capricious infliction of the death penalty.1
The edict of the Supreme Court in Godfrey that a sentencer's discretion
be channeled by clear and objective standards is directly applicable to the
argument presented in this article. The lack of unanimity and reasonable
doubt requirements for the vileness sub-elements offers no guidance to a
capital jury in Virginia. The jury is merely instructed to find vileness
beyond a reasonable doubt with vague references to the sub-elements of
torture, depravity of mind and aggravated battery. This constitutes a lack
of clear and objective standards.'
188. Id.; see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding death
sentences require a heightened degree of reliability because death sentences are qualitatively
different from other punishments).
189. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422-23 (1980); GA. CODE ANN. S 27-
2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
190. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427-29.
191. Id. at 428 (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 426 (internal citation omitted in original).
193. See id. at 428-29. The Court noted ordinary people could reasonably characterize
any murder as involving outrageous or wanton vileness or involving horrible or inhuman
characteristics. Id.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,206-07 (1976) (Stewart, J.) (holding
that the Georgia death penalty scheme adequately addresses the constitutional concerns raised
in Furman v. Georgia because the scheme properly channels the jury's discretion and prevents
imposition of the death penalty in a capricious and arbitrary manner); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
194. For a discussion of how the current Virginia Model Jury Instruction on vileness
fails to provide the constitutionally required dear and objective standards, see Ray, supra note
136, at 96 (proposing amendments to the Virginia Model Jury Instruction on vileness
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Particularly relevant to this discussion is the Godfrey Court's analysis
of the Georgia Supreme Court cases analyzing the vileness aggravator.
Following the Gregg v. Georgia's decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia
made some observations about the Georgia vileness cases, noting the central-
ity of both unanimity and proof beyond reasonable doubt."s For example,
the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded the following: "We believe that
each of [the vileness cases] establishes beyond any reasonable doubt a deprav-
ity of mind and either involved torture or an aggravated battery to the
victim as illustrating the crimes were outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble or inhuman." 97 Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded from
its vileness cases that the similarity of torture and aggravated battery and
their collective dissimilarity to depravity of mind mandated unanimous
verdicts.198
Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the elements of
torture, depravity of mind and aggravated battery were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt in a number of its vileness cases and that these elements
required unanimity.' These conclusions were indirectly endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court in Godfrey. The Godfrey Court noted that the
Supreme Court of Georgia had reached these limiting conclusions about
Georgia's vileness aggravator.2" However, because these limiting conclu-
sions were not employed by the trial court in Godfrey, the vileness aggrava-
tor did not properly channel the sentencer's discretion."' 1 The Godfrey
Court implied that if the standards articulated by the Supreme Court of
Georgia had been used by Godfrey's trial court, the sentencer's discretion
including detailed definitions of the sub-elements).
195. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
196. See Harris v. State, 230 S.E.2d 1, 11 (Ga. 1976); Blake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 637, 643
(Ga. 1977); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200-01 (1976) (Stewart, J.) (rejectig
defendant's claim that Georgia's vileness aggravator was so vague that juries were free to "act
as arbitrarily and capriciously as they wish in deciding whether to impose the death penalty"
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
197. Harris, 230 S.E.2d at 11 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (reviewing vileness
cases and affirming death sentence based on a vileness finding because the crime was at the
.core" of the vileness aggravating circumstance).
198. Blake, 236 S.E.2d at 643 (affirming death sentence and holding that the three factors
of torture, aggravated battery, and depravity of mind are capable of unanimity but need not
be found unanimously if the more general finding of vileness is found unanimously).
199. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432-33.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 432. The Court concluded that in Godfrey's case the trial courts did not
"satisfy the [limiting] criteria laid out by the Georgia Supreme Court itself in the Harris and
Blake cases." Id.
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might have been properly channeled and appropriate standards employed. 2
Two of these standards articulated by the Supreme Court of Georgia were
unanimity as to the vileness sub-elements and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of the sub-elements. 3 If the use of these two standards would have
made the Georgia vileness aggravator constitutionally permissible in
Godfrey, then the same standards must be employed in Virginia in order to
comport with Godfrey's mandate of clear and objective standards. By
requiring a capital jury to agree unanimously upon which sub-element the
finding of vileness is based and find that sub-element beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury is adequately directed to consider the factual basis of the
murder and how it evidences the defendant's depraved mind or propensity
towards torturing his victims or battering them in an aggravated manner.
Unanimity and a reasonable doubt standard for the vileness sub-elements
will offer specific sentencing instruction to capital juries and should there-
fore be employed to comply with Godfey's edict for clear and objective
standards in capital sentencing."04
3. The Needfor Reliability
In Woodson v. North Carolina0 . the United States Supreme Court
struck down North Carolina's mandatory death penalty scheme for any
first-degree murder conviction.' In so doing, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that a sentence of death is "qualitatively different" from a sentence of
life imprisonment. 7 Because of this qualitative difference, the Court found
that "there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." 2°8
This heightened need for reliability in capital cases is satisfied by the
requirement of unanimity and proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the
vileness sub-elements. Requiring unanimity for the vileness sub-elements
ensures that the jury will focus its inquiry on the details of the murder and
202. Id. at 432.
203. See Blake, 236 S.E.2d at 643; Harris, 230 S.E.2d at 10-11.
204. For a discussion of how the current Virginia Model Jury Instruction on vileness
fails to provide the constitutionally required clear and objective standards, see Ray, supra note
136, at 96 (proposing amendments to the Virginia Model Jury Instruction on vileness
including more detailed definitions of the sub-elements).
205. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
206. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding death sentences






on the meaning of the vileness sub-element in question. Further, it will
require the jury to agree on the definition of the sub-element and to find
that the details of the crime fall squarely within that definition before
recommending a death sentence. Unanimity guarantees that the jury will
properly perform the inquiry which it was empaneled to conduct.
Similarly, the reasonable doubt requirement protects the integrity of
the criminal trial. A capital jury that finds vileness without agreeing that a
sub-element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt is encouraged to con-
sider other evidence introduced at sentencing and impose a punishment
based on factors other than the aggravator. As the Richardson Court
warned, this encourages juries to conclude that "where there is smoke there
must be fire."' By requiring the jury to consider every doubt they have
about a defendant's conduct in committing a murder, the court will ensure
that the jury has properly questioned whether the aggravator has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's intense consideration of the
evidence to reach a decision beyond all reasonable doubt enhances the
reliability of the sentencing process.
To honor the Eight Amendment's underlying respect for humanity,
the reliability of death sentences should be the goal of any capital sentencing
scheme. By requiring a capital jury to focus its sentencing deliberations on
the factual details of the crime and agree on their findings unanimously and
beyond all reasonable doubt, the reliability of capital sentencing in Virginia
is enhanced. Both the reliability requirement of Woodson and the Eighth
Amendment are satisfied by requiring unanimity and reasonable doubt for
the vileness sub-elements.
IV Conclusion
The Jones, Richardson, and Apprendi trilogy represents a break in the
United States Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence with respect to judicial
discretion at sentencing. The Court had evaded issues raised by sentencing
factors that were not found by a jury and that increased a defendant's
punishment beyond that prescribed by law. The Court, in a number of
opinions, successfully avoided the constitutional issues that the sentencing
factors raised. However, Jones and Richardson foreshadowed that these
issues could be ignored no longer. In Apprendi, the Court confronted these
issues because they could no longer be avoided.
Reading these three cases as a trilogy and considering their implications
beyond their specific holdings presents an opportunity for substantial
reform of the Virginia capital sentencing scheme. The decisions require that
the vileness sub-elements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a capital
209. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 819 (1999).
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jury and further require the jury to agree unanimously as to which sub-
element formed the basis of their finding of vileness. Richardson serves to
elevate the vileness sub-elements to elements and mandates that the jury
agree unanimously upon which element their finding of vileness is based.
Apprendi requires that the vileness sub-element be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. These reforms will provide the jury clear and objective stan-
dards to guide its decision and will enhance the reliability of the Virginia
capital sentencing scheine.
The Virginia capital sentencing scheme is designed to ensure that no
defendant in Virginia is put to death without being afforded due process of
law. A sentence of death based on vileness under the current application of
the vileness aggravator is done without due consideration of the underlying
details of a crime. The aspects of the crime applicable to the vileness deter-
mination are only considered in general terms while other aspects of sen-
tencing not relevant to the vileness determination are given undue weight.
The jury instinctively decides based on all the evidence presented at sentenc-
ing whether a defendant's conduct was vile or not.
Unanimity will require the jury to make a specific factual determina-
tion of vileness instead of the generalized finding that is acceptable under the
current application of the Virginia capital sentencing scheme. The jury
must consider the details of the crime and compare them to the different
sub-elements of the vileness aggravator. In order to find that the details
amount to one of these elements, the jury must agree unanimously. This
will require the jury to debate the factual basis for each sub-element and
agree in unison on its presence. This is the role the jury was designed to
perform at sentencing under the Virginia capital sentencing scheme. Fur-
ther, requiring the jury to decide that the aggravator was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt will provide the jury clear and objective standards with
which to make its decision. This will enhance the reliability of the death
sentence. These reforms should be implemented to guarantee that all death
sentences are imposed fairly and without any indicia of impropriety.
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